As one of the most outstanding philosophers (faläsifa) in the Muslim world, Avicenna (Ibn Sina, d. 428/1037) showed a great interest in the Qur'an and in Islamic religion in general.
that the belief might arise that He is one essence, and cannot possibly have an associate in species, nor have an existential (wujudï) part -be it a part that has a quantitative existence or that exists in the mindand that this essence cannot be outside nor inside the world, nor be subject to a precise localisation. [However,] it is forbidden to expose this to the common people.
Next, Avicenna argues that the Torah and the Qur'an, when speaking about the essence of God, had to use anthropomorphic expressions, since they are the only ones accessible to the common people. The aim of any philosophical reading of the Qur'an is therefore to restore pure tawhïd by interpreting, allegorically, the figurative language of the Prophet. 5 Applying this general principle as exposed in his Adhawiyya, Avicenna devoted a tafsïr to Sürat al-Ikhläs, which comprises one of the longest of his Qur'anic commentaries. 6 This treatise is particularly important for our present purpose as Avicenna uses here his main metaphysical concepts -such as huwiyya, wäjib al-wujüd, mumkin al-wujüd, lawäzim, muqawwimät -in order to interpret the revealed text. 7 However, if the tools used by Avicenna are philosophical, his aim is theological: it is to establish the radicality of tawhïd by a philosophical analysis of every word of the sura. Although this sura -also known as Sürat al-Tawhïd and al-Samadiyya -is generally considered as the purest expression of God's unity and uniqueness in the Qur'an, the text still needs, according to Avicenna, a philosophical exegesis in order to prove that what is said about God in the four ayas of the sura is in no way contradicting His absolute simplicity. The author's main point is that in the first two ayas, only huwa refers to the Necessary Existent in Himself, whereas all the remaining words {Allah, ahad, al-samad) are necessary concomitants {lawäzim) caused by the Necessary Existent. As we shall see, this radical interpretation, which is at variance with all previous commentaries on Sürat al-Ikhläs? although being in line with Avicenna's general conception of the divine attributes, 9 raises some startling questions.
Without entering into all details of the complex argumentation developed in this very condensed text, Avicenna's interpretation of Q. 112 can be summarised as follows.
Qui huwa Allähu ahad (Q. 112:1)
Avicenna takes the word huwa as referring to the 'absolute He' {al-huwa al-mutlaq), whose 'ipseity' {huwiyya) is not dependent on another being, as 'He is He by His own essence' {huwa huwa li-dhätihi). This is the Necessary Existent {wäjib al-wujüd) whose quiddity (mähiyya) is identical with His existence {wujüd): His essence is that He exists. The absolute huwiyya cannot be expressed by any name {ism); it can only be explained {shark) by the concomitants {lawäzim) that necessarily follow from His In other words: the unknowable essence of the Necessary Existent manifests itself by its closest concomitant -'the divinity' -expressed by the name Allah. Such is the meaning of the first two words of the sura:
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As He indicates by His word huwa that the pure and simple ipseity is a reality that cannot be expressed otherwise than [by saying] that He is He, and given the fact that the only way to make it [i.e. this ipseity] known, is by one of its concomitants, He mentions immediately after this the concomitant which is the closest to it: the divinity, that combines two concomitants, a negative and a positive one.
From the preceding passages it appears that Avicenna applies in his Tafsïr the term 'concomitant' {läzim) both to the beings proceeding from the Necessary Existent and to His attributes, or at least to the name Allah and the property of 'divinity', which are explicitly designated as concomitants of the absolute huwiyya.
Next, the aya states, according to Avicenna's interpretation, that the Necessary Existent's inaccessible essence, manifested through its concomitant Allah, is 'one' {ahad). This means that His essence is absolutely one in itself, having no constituents, while its multiple concomitants are all caused. As 'He is He by His own essence', there is no kind of division in Him. He can only be said 'one' in an analogical way {bil-tashkïk), 23 as His unity, distinct from the numerical one, transcends the different forms of unity which are peculiar to the beings caused by Him. 24 After this lengthy philosophical analysis of the first aya of the sura, which takes up two thirds of the whole Tafsïr, 25 Avicenna is now able to explain the remaining three ayas.
AMhu'l-samad (Q. 112:2)
Relying on the current interpretation given to the problematic word al-samad by the mufassirün, who understand it in two quite different ways, as meaning either 'what has no hollowness' {lä jawf lahu) or 'the master' {al-sayyid), 26 Avicenna takes the term in both senses. As a concomitant of the same kind as al-ilähiyya, its first sense is negative -the Necessary Existent has no quiddity which is distinct from His essence -and its second sense is positive: the affirmation that He is the principle of all beings {mabda 3 al-kull). In this way, the word al-samad confirms the meaning of the name Allah, which expresses the same negation and affirmation. 27 The first two ayas thus refer to the unknowable huwiyya of the Necessary Existent, which is revealed by its closest concomitants: Allah and al-samad.
Lam yalid wa-lam yülad (Q. 112:3)
This aya, according to Avicenna, states that the Necessary Existent is the principle of all beings, but without affecting His absolute unity. All things proceed from His liberality (jüd) by emanation (fayd), but it is impossible that something similar to Him proceeds from Him, as nothing can participate in His quiddity nor can share the same quiddity with Him. The quiddity of the Necessary Existent is identical with His existence, whereas the possible existents proceeding from Him have a quiddity distinct from their existence. Hence, He has no 'children', as 'He has not begotten' {lam yalid). 'He was not begotten' {lam yülad), as 'He is He by His own essence', and does not depend on anything else. 28 
Wa-lam yakun lahu kufu'an ahad (Q. 112:4)
The last aya of the sura contains the logical conclusion of what precedes. The Necessary Existent has no equal: nothing shares the same quiddity with Him; nothing is equal to Him in the necessity of existence. He is the only Necessary Existent by Himself; hence He is absolutely one and unique. 29 After summarising his interpretation of Surat al-Ikhlas, Avicenna concludes his Tafsïr with the following statement: 31 As the ultimate aim of those who pursue the sciences in their totality is the knowledge of God's essence and attributes {sifät) and the way His actions proceed from Him, and as this sura refers to the path which reveals and points to all that concerns the study of God's essence, it is certainly equivalent to a third of the Qur'an.
This is exactly the goal of any philosophical reading of the Qur'an, according to Avicenna, as he clearly expressed it in his Risala al-adhawiyya.
***
However impressive Avicenna's reading of Sürat al-Ikhläs may be, his interpretation of the first two ayas raises a doctrinal problem. Throughout his Tafsïr, he repeats time and again that Allah and 'the divinity' {al-ilähiyya), along with al-samad, are close concomitants of the Necessary Existent, that are 'making known' His ipseity which is unknowable in itself, in the same way as His ipseity is 'made known' by the hierarchy of beings emanating from it by necessity. In other words, the Tafsïr presents as concomitants, caused {ma c lül) by the Necessary Existent, both the multiplicity of emanated beings or 'creatures' (which is common Avicennian doctrine) and of divine attributes such as al-samad, even going as far as to qualify the name Allah and 'the divinity' as caused concomitants of the Necessary Existent. Or, to put it in still other terms: Avicenna seems to introduce an ontological distinction between, on the one hand, huwa -which refers to the uncaused ipseity of the Necessary Existent -and, on the other, Allah and al-samad, the closest concomitants of the Necessary Existent which, as concomitants, are caused by Him.
This observation initially led us to have some doubts about the attribution of the text to Avicenna. But after closer study, these doubts have almost entirely disappeared, although a main difficulty subsists.
The manuscript tradition is unanimous in ascribing the Tafsïr to Avicenna. According to one of its editors, al-Khatïb, and also to Mandavi, there are no less than 39 manuscripts, 32 the oldest dated one being MS Chester Beatty 3045, copied in 699/1299. 33 There exist several commentaries on the Tafsïr (for instance by Jaläl al-Din Muhammad b. As c ad al-Sadïqï, d. 918/1512); furthermore, the treatise was translated into Persian, Turkish and Urdu. 34 All manuscripts, translations, commentaries and editions present it under the name of Avicenna.
Even stronger than this external evidence is the internal evidence we obtained by a close study of the contents of the treatise: the terminology is undoubtedly Avicennian; moreover, we were able to trace for almost every passage of the Tafsïr, parallel This again is very close to the argument developed in the Tafsïr. 40 Explaining further in the Ta c lïqat that there is no plurality in the Necessary Existent by Himself, Avicenna states that there cannot be a diversity of attributes in His essence: if this were the case, the attributes would be constitutive parts of His essence, so that His essence would be dependent on these parts and would no longer be one. In consequence, all the attributes are concomitants of his essence: 41 The oneness in the First proceeds from Him { c anhu) and is in Him (fl-hi) as it is one of His concomitants.
As we have seen, Avicenna establishes in his Tafsïr Sürat al-Ikhläs, with philosophical arguments taken from his metaphysics, God's absolute unity and uniqueness, which is not hampered by the multiple concomitants proceeding from Him. At the same time, he states that God's essence, unknowable in itself, is revealed to the human mind by its concomitants. This notion of 'concomitant' is central to the treatise, whereas the term sifät ('attributes') only occurs once, at the very end of the Tafsïr. 42 Nevertheless, if we read the text carefully, it is clear that Avicenna means here by 'concomitants' both God's attributes and the beings proceeding from Him. 
The parallel passages from the
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Of course, this is not Avicenna's opinion! Nevertheless, his Tafsïr implies that God, as He reveals Himself in the Qur'an, is 'caused' by an emanation proceeding from the Necessary Existent. This seems at first sight a daring statement and it is perhaps for this reason that Avicenna avoided using the term 'attributes' in his Tafsïr. 48 However, it is more likely that this assertion should not be understood too radically, as becomes clear from the post-Avicennian tradition.
Some mufassirün, posterior to Avicenna and manifestly under his influence, introduce a 'gradation' within the three words which form the first aya of Sürat al-Ikhläs. This is the case in Fakhr al-Dïn al-Râzï's Tafsïr, according to which the three terms refer to three different 'stations' {maqämät) among 'those who seek (the divine knowledge)' {al-tälibün). Hamza and Rizvi summarise al-Râzï's text as follows: 'huwa signifies the undifferentiated one essence that alone requires existence through itself and through whom all other essences are brought into existence, at the level of huwa there is no existence except God. The next term is that of differentiation: God exists -the Lord over His creation which also exists. ardarì) where it appears in a similar context related to the emanation of a hierarchy of beings (including the cosmic Intelligences) out of the Necessary Existent. Nasïr al-Dïn al-Tusï comments on this passage as follows (also p. 278): 'the science of the First is an act that belongs to Him by His essence and this science encompasses the totality of the existents. He apprehends intellectually what succeeds to Him in the order of being, namely the first caused existent, which, in its turn, is the cause of what succeeds to it in the order of being. Knowing a cause perfectly means to know all the concomitants that necessarily proceed from this cause. Thus, the First apprehends intellectually all the things caused by the first caused existent, because all these things belong to a chain of beings that proceed from the first caused existent and end at it. This descending chain can be either vertical {tülan) or horizontal { c ardan).' By 'vertical', al-Tusï means the chain of the caused beings that are put in an order ending at the first caused existent. By 'horizontal', he means the chain of accidents {hawädith) that are put in an order not ending directly at the first caused existent, but nevertheless related to it insofar as this chain of accidents needs the first caused existent in order to exist. This need is like a transversal link that establishes a kind of equality between all the elements of the horizontal chain with respect to God. Thus, for al-Tusï, the contingency of the accidents is reduced by this horizontal link between the accidents and the first caused existent. The whole passage should be taken into account when interpreting Avicenna's theory of God's knowledge of the particulars. It has to be noticed that al-Tusï does not use here the term a c räd for 'accidents', but rather hawädith, obviously in order to avoid confusion with 
